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change from Henry to the RSPT to the MRRT can best be understood in the context of the Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) as a capitalist workers' party. The author argues that it is this tension in the ALP, the 
shift in its internal balance further towards capital and the lack of class struggle, that has seen Labor 
preside over what the father of rent tax in Australia, Ross Garnaut, describes as a "problematic" tax. 
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THE MINERALS RESOURCE RENT TAX - THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR 
PARTY AND THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE 
I INTRODUCTION 
In this article I look at the recent history of proposals to tax resource rents in Australia, from 
Australia’s Future Tax System Report
1
 (the ‘Henry Tax Review’) through to the proposed 
Resource Super Profits Tax (‘RSPT’) and then the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (‘MRRT’). 
The process of change from Henry to the RSPT to the MRRT can best be understood, not just 
in the context of bad design, but, building on the work of Bramble and Kuhn, in the context 
of the Australian Labor Party as a capitalist workers’ party.
2
 I argue that it is this tension in 
the ALP, the shift in its internal balance further towards capital and the lack of class struggle 
that has seen Labor preside over what the father of rent tax in Australia, Ross Garnaut, 
describes as a ‘problematic’ tax.
3
  
The paper argues that the poor health of the MRRT is a consequence of the nature of the 
Labor Party as a capitalist workers’ party, the shifts in power and influence within its material 
constitution
4
 and in essence the ascendency of capital in the capitalist workers’ party. What 
then is a capitalist workers’ party? 
                                                          
1
 Ken Henry et al, Australia’s Future Tax System Report to the Treasurer (AGPS, 2010). There are 3 parts to the 
Report and they have 3 distinct footnote references in this article. 1 (a)  Ken Henry et al, Australia’s Future Tax 
System Report to the Treasurer (AGPS, 2010) Part One the Overview; 1 (b) Ken Henry et al, Australia’s Future 
Tax System Report to the Treasurer (AGPS, 2010) Part Two Detailed Analysis Volume One and 1 (c) Ken 
Henry et al, Australia’s Future Tax System Report to the Treasurer (AGPS, 2010) Part Two Detailed Analysis 
Volume Two. The link to the Final Report – all 3 sections plus other material - can be found here. 
<http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_reports.htm.>.   
2
 Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, Labor’s Conflict: Big business, workers and the politics of class (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 17. See also Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, ‘Continuity or Discontinuity in the Recent 
History of the Australian Labor Party?’ (2009) 44(2) Australian Journal of Political Science 281, 281. 
3
 Senate Economics References Committee, ‘Development and operation of the minerals resource rent tax’ 
Public Hearings Monday, 29 April 2013, 1 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/90627bc4-26d1-4498-a3f4-
760f55d745a7/toc_pdf/Economics%20References%20Committee_2013_04_29_1920.pdf;fileType=application
%2Fpdf#search=%22Id=media/pressclp/2457335%22>. 
4
 Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, Labor’s Conflict: Big business, workers and the politics of class (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 14-18. 
II A CAPITALIST WORKERS’ PARTY? 
It was Lenin who outlined a set of useful criteria one could use for judging the real class 
nature of a workers’ party. He said that ‘whether or not a party is really a political party of the 
workers does not depend solely upon a membership of workers but also upon the men [and 
women] that lead it, and the content of its actions and its political tactics.’
5
 Building on this 
insight, Bramble and Kuhn argue that the material constitution of the Labor Party, in other 
words ‘its relationship with the different class forces in society’
6
 judged by the criteria Lenin 
suggests, means that the ALP is a capitalist workers’ party.
7
 It is a workers’ party because of 
‘its structural connection to the working class – albeit indirectly – via the trade union 
bureaucracy.’
8
 It is a capitalist party ‘because of the class interests of the politicians and 
unions officials who lead and control it, and because of the role it plays for the capitalist 
class.’
9
 Labor manages capitalism; its ‘priority is to make capitalism work.’
10
 The 
relationship between labour and capital is fundamentally contradictory and the ALP is a 
dialectical structure which contains in both senses of the word that contradiction. The party 
has a dual nature – capitalist in its leadership and program but with a working class base and 
links to that class through the trade union bureaucracy.
11
 
Labor adopts the dominant economic philosophy of the time when in government because it 
is a party committed to managing capitalism.
12
 The needs of capital in the capital 
                                                          
5
 V I Lenin, ‘The Second Congress of The Communist International July 19-August 7, 1920: Speech on 
Affiliation to The British Labour Party 6 August 1920’ 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jul/x03.htm#fw6>. 
6
 Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, above n 4, 15. 
7
 Ibid 17. 
8
 Ben Hillier, ‘The ALP: What class of party?’ (Autumn 2011) 2 Marxist Left Review 
<http://marxistleftreview.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62:the-alp-what-class-of-
party&catid=39:number-2-autumn-2011&Itemid=78>. 
9
 Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, above n 4, 17-18.  
10
 Ibid, 18. See also, for example, Joachim Hirsch, ‘The State Apparatus and Social Reproduction’, in John 
Holloway and Sol Picciotto (eds), State and Capital (Edward Arnold, 1978) 103. Hirsh argues that during crises 
of profitability especially, states defend profit and attack workers’ incomes.  
11
 Ben Hillier, above n 8.  
12
 Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, above n 4, 22. 
accumulation process change over time. The rise of neoliberalism is a response to the 
reassertion of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall from the late 1960s and early 1970s
13
 
and a search for ways to address that, in the main looking for what Marx called counteracting 
or countervailing tendencies.
14
 In the age of neoliberalism cutting taxes on capital is seen as 
one way of doing that. It frees up more surplus value going to capital. According to the Rudd 
Labor Government in 2010 company tax cuts could be paid for by imposing a resource rent 
tax to help equalise profit rates and redistribute that ‘extra’ surplus value from mining capital 
to all of capital.  
While the relationship between Labor and capital has become more complex and intertwined, 
at the same time the labour movement has declined in influence and power. Couple the end of 
the long boom with a collapse in class struggle in Australia over the last 3 decades
15
  and the 
decline of trade unions and their membership numbers and the result has been ‘an ebb tide in 
union affairs, a period of retreat that is still in progress.’
16
 Because of the decline of union 
strength both in numbers and action, the material constitution of the ALP has shifted. It 
remains a capitalist workers’ party in which the influence of capital has strengthened and that 
of labour and trade unions weakened.  Bramble and Kuhn summarise the wider trends well 
when they say: 
The rightward shift in social democratic governments since the early 1970s can be 
understood, more specifically, as a consequence of capitalism’s tendency to economic crisis, 
                                                          
13
 Neil Davidson, ‘The neoliberal era in Britain: Historical developments and current perspectives’ (5 July 2013) 
139 International Socialism Journal <http://isj.org.uk/?id=908#139davidson_28>; Ashley Lavelle, 
‘Explanations for the Neo-liberal Direction of Social Democracy: Germany, Sweden and Australia Compared’, 
in John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson and Martin McIvor (eds), In Search of Social Democracy: 
Responses to Crisis and Modernisation (Manchester University Press, 2009) 23; Al Campbell, ‘The Birth of 
Neoliberalism in the United States: a Reorganisation of Capitalism’, in Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah 
Johnston (eds), Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. London: Pluto Press, 2005) 189. 
14
 Karl Marx, Capital Volume III ((Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959) 227-235. 
15
 See for example Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide (Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, 2008) 7; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4102.0 - Australian Social Trends, 2008: 
Industrial Disputes <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Chapter7302008>. 
16
Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide (Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 2008) 125. 
the reaction of governments the world over to accelerated globalisation and the relative lack 
of political and industrial self-confidence amongst workers since the upsurge of working class 
militancy of the 1960s and 1970s abated.
17
 
In relation to tax the needs of the capital accumulation process set the drivers for, parameters 
of and constraints on tax change and together with the factors Bramble and Kuhn have 
outlined above help explain the neoliberalisation of tax policy
18
 and how a new tax imposing 
an increased liability on mining capital is part of the neoliberal project. To understand the 
limits of change we need first to look at the dependence of the state on the capital 
accumulation process. 
III MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
Tax is an extraction from surplus value, the difference between the value a worker creates 
and the value of their labour power.
19
 The creation of surplus value in the production process 
is thus vital to the ability of the state to raise revenue and survive. It cannot do so by 
undermining the process of capital accumulation.
20
 Without productive capital employing 
productive workers to produce surplus value, there would be no funds for the state to tax.
21
 
There is a structural dependence of the state, and other capital, on productive capital.
22
 But 
                                                          
17
 Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, ‘Social Democracy after the Long Boom: Economic Restructuring and 
Australian Labor, 1983 to 1996’ in Martin Upchurch, (ed), The State and Globalisation: Comparative Studies of 
Labour  and Capital in National Economies, (1999, Cassell, London), 34. 
18
 See for example John Passant, ‘The Privatization of Tax Law Design – From Farce to Tragedy’ (2008) 6 
Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 447; John Passant, ‘Neoliberalism in Australia and the Henry Tax Review’ 
forthcoming (2013) 8 (1) Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association. 
19
 Chris Harman, Zombie Capitalism: Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx (Pluto Press, 2009) 114. As 
Harman notes elsewhere ‘To be absolutely accurate, it is the total state revenues minus that portion of them that 
flows back to the working class in terms of welfare benefits, subsidies etc that is part of the total surplus value; 
and the value of labour power is total take home wages plus these benefits, subsidies etc.’ Chris Harman, ‘The 
State and Capitalism today’ (Summer 1991) 2: 51 International Socialism Journal 3, 53 at footnote 28 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1991/xx/statcap.htm#n28>. 
20
 Chris Harman, Zombie Capitalism: Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx (Pluto Press, 2009) 112. 
21
Productive capital is that section of capital in which their workers, productive workers, create surplus value, 
i.e. produce goods and services for sale on the market. See for example Karl Marx, Capital Volume I (Progress 
Publishers, Moscow 1977) 149 and 201; Alex Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx (Bookmarks, 
London, 1996) 219; Chris Harman, above n 20, 114. 
22
 One view is that structural dependence means that ‘under capitalism all governments must respect and protect 
the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth.’ See Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, 
‘Structural Dependence of the State on Capital’ (March 1988), 82 (1) The American Political Science Review 
the dependency is mutual because capital also depends on the state for a range of capital 
protecting institutions, laws, secure borders in which to operate, regulation of disputes 
between capitalists, the supply of labour, the development of a skilled working class and its 
control. Productive capital depends too on other capital, especially finance capital and 
commercial capital, for the ability to create and realise surplus value.   
However productive capital, commercial capital, finance capital, landlords and the state - the 
band of hostile brothers
23
 - also compete or fight among themselves for a share of the surplus 
value productive workers produce. The result of the fight over the distribution of surplus 
value, whether it be in the form of profits, interest, rent or taxes, is determined by a range of 
factors, but in the end all are dependent in the first place on the creation of surplus value in 
the productive sector for their particular share of it. This fundamental of capitalism and 
mutual interdependence
24
 sets the limits of the autonomy from capital and capital 
accumulation that any state can develop.
25
 Part of that battle among the hostie brothers is over 
rent, the excess surplus value that accrues to sections of capital for reasons that do not reflect 
the level of capital and labour investment. 
A Rent 
Surplus value is surplus or unpaid labour. It is created in the sphere of production but arises 
in concrete form in the sphere of circulation, i.e. the market. Its particular form, profit, 
interest, rent, taxes arises there. Competition means that there is a tendency for profit rates to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11. There Przeworski and Wallerstein examine and critique this argument, as do others. In the tax context see 
for example Duane Swank, ‘Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in 
Advanced Market Economies’ (1998) 46 (4) Political Studies 671. For a defence of the idea of the mutual 
interdependence of capital and the state, see Chris Harman, above n 20, 110-112. 
23
 I would use siblings instead of brothers but the phrase is now so entrenched in Marxist and other leftwing 
writing that it is seemingly untouchable. Interestingly, although Marx talked about hostile brothers, he never 
called them a band. Later writers ascribed the whole phrase to Marx and it is now so established in leftwing 
discourse that I use it to describe capitalists who own and control the commanding heights of the economy and 
have interests in common (against labour) and opposed (in competition) to each other, and their state.  
24
 Chris Harman, above n 20, 114. 
25
 Ibid 111-112. 
equalise. More profitable sectors attract increased investment both reducing that sectors 
average profit and increasing the sector the investment left.  Sometimes this process of 
equalisation is blocked by what Marx calls an alien force,
26
 for example by monopoly or 
landed property. This means that certain sectors can obtain a share of the surplus value 
greater than a normal return on its investment suggests it would under usual market 
conditions receive.
27
  
These particular circumstances enable the retention or extraction of extra surplus value, i.e. 
surplus value from the other hostile brothers. One of those circumstances is the monopoly of 
private property in land. Another is that monopoly of resources in land, or rather an oligopoly 
between state ownership of resources in minerals and private ownership of land. It is why for 
example the Henry Tax Review referred not just to resource rents but to the rent taxes it 
proposed arising from state ownership of the resources in Australia as being ‘a charge for the 
sale of a public asset.’
28
 But it is not just the Commonwealth and the mining companies who 
want to obtain mining rents.  
B Royalties 
There is a bifurcation of the state in Australia between States and Territories on the one hand 
and the Commonwealth on the other. The States and Territories own the minerals and 
                                                          
26
 Karl Marx, above n 14, 761-762. 
27
 One at least of these circumstances – absolute rent - can be explained as the value of the goods being greater 
than their prices of production.
27
 This can occur for example in labour intensive industries. So the price of these 
commodities can rise above their actual price of production but still be below their value. The difference 
between the actual price and the price of production is absolute rent. As David Harvey says ‘Part of the excess 
surplus value produced in agriculture by its labour intensity (lower value composition) is “filched” (as Marx 
puts it) by the landlord, so it does not enter into the equalization of the rate of profit.’ David Harvey, The Limits 
to Capital (Basil Blackwell, 1982) 351. But for industries with a high Organic Composition of Capital and alien 
forces preventing equalisation of profit rates, like mining in Australia, the argument becomes that that those 
barriers to entry or other alien forces allow the filching to continue, not as absolute rent but monopoly rent. 
David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Basil Blackwell, 1982) 349 and 353. 
28
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1(b), 219. 
resources on the Australian mainland; the Commonwealth owns the offshore ones.
29
 The 
Commonwealth effectively exercises a monopoly right to tax income.
30
 This bifurcation and 
the failure to replace inefficient royalties with an efficient rent tax is one of the problems of 
the MRRT.
31
 Thus the Henry Tax Review recommended that ‘the current resource rent 
arrangements … be replaced by a uniform resource rent tax,’
32
 or in other words abolish State 
and Territory royalties and replace them with a Commonwealth resource rent tax. Of course 
this would also require the Australian and State Governments negotiating ‘…an appropriate 
allocation of the revenues and risks from the resource rent tax.’
33
 However neither the Rudd 
Labor Government with its proposed RSPT nor the Gillard Labor Government with its 
MRRT had the strength of working class or other political support to negotiate this outcome 
or impose it on the States and Territories. Its relationship with the various class and political 
forces – its material constitution - was inadequate to deliver an efficient resource rent tax 
outcome. Instead it shielded State and Territory royalties, an inefficient outcome for capital 
                                                          
29
 The States own the minerals and resources onshore and to the 3 nautical mile territorial limit; the 
Commonwealth anything beyond that within Australia’s jurisdiction. See Anthony Cox, ‘Land Access for 
Mineral Development in Australia’,32 in Roderick G. Egger (ed) Mining and the Environment: International 
Perspectives on Public Policy (1994, Resources for the Future).  The Hawke Labor Government set up the 
Petroleum Resource Rent Tax in the mid-1980s to tax economic rent arising from offshore petroleum and gas 
exploitation. For a fuller explanation see John McLaren, ‘Petroleum and Mineral Resource Rent Taxes: Could 
these taxation principles have a wider application?’ (2012) 10 Macquarie Law Journal 69. 
30
 Thomas Courchene,  ‘Subnational Budgetary and Stabilization Policies in Canada and Australia’ in James M. 
Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen (eds), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance (University of Chicago Press 
1999) Table 12.1 page 304. 
31
 Ross Garnaut says: ‘There is no prospect of dealing with the full range of the MRRT problems except in the 
context of a new framework of federal financial relations. I note in passing that the system for distributing the 
GST among states and territories creates large disincentives for the states and territories to introduce on their 
own account fiscal regimes for resource developments that are economically efficient and equitable for the 
residents of their jurisdictions. Thus efficiency raising and equitable reform of resource taxation in Australia 
requires comprehensive revision of fundamental aspects of federal financial relations.’ Ross Garnaut, 
‘Development and operation of the minerals resource rent tax’ Senate Economics References Committee Public 
Hearings Monday, 29 April 2013, 1 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/90627bc4-26d1-4498-a3f4-
760f55d745a7/toc_pdf/Economics%20References%20Committee_2013_04_29_1920_Official.pdf;fileType=ap
plication%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/commsen/90627bc4-26d1-4498-a3f4-760f55d745a7/0001%22>. 
Garnaut also said: ‘Retention of state royalties means that the advantages of the  
PRRT for encouragement of complete economic utilisation of marginal ore projects are not available within the 
MRRT. The shielding of liability for MRRT through credits for new state royalties invites instability in the 
overall mineral taxation regime and can be expected to remove the tax's capacity to raise revenue.’  Abolishing 
royalties was within Labor’s control if it were prepared or pushed to deny MRRT credits for such taxes. It 
didn’t, because its links to its working class base have weakened.  
32
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1(b), 231. 
33
 Ibid. 
but not for the States and Territories. They could then increase these inefficient taxes at the 
expense of Commonwealth revenue, as they have done.  The political outcome achieved the 
exact opposite of one of the main rationales for a resource rent tax that the Review argued for 
– the replacement of inefficient royalties with an efficient rent tax. 
Efficient taxes are at the heart of the Henry Tax Review. What are they and why are they 
important?  
C Efficiency and tax 
The Henry Tax Review’s vision is of four robust and efficient tax bases to replace the more 
than 100 mainly State and Territory inefficient taxes.
34
   The vision and direction is of a 
comprehensive personal income tax, growth oriented business income tax, a broad simple 
consumption tax and taxes capturing economic rents in resources and land.
35
 These four tax 
bases are what Swank describes in another context more generally as part of a ‘set of market-
conforming tax policies’
36
 or in effect neoliberal tax policies.
37
  Efficiency here is capitalist 
efficiency. The irony is that the more efficient the capital accumulation system is the earlier 
and more deeply can the systemic crisis of profitability built on the logic of capital 
accumulation unfold. Resource rent taxes are part of this neoliberalisation because they ‘offer an 
efficient way to divert a share of rents on natural resources to the public sector…’
38
 Rent 
taxes are efficient taxes, so the argument goes, precisely because they impact on investment 
and other decisions the least.
39
 Since ‘rents exist where the proceeds from the sale of 
resources exceed the cost of exploration and extraction, including a required rate of return to 
                                                          
34
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1 (a), 11. 
35
 Ibid, xvii. 
36
 Duane Swank, ‘Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism’ (2006) 
60(4) International Organization 847, 848. 
37
 Ibid 847-848. 
38
 Robin Boadway, From Optimal Tax Theory to Tax Policy: Retrospective and Prospective Views (The MIT 
Press, 2012) 7. 
39
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1(a) 13. 
compensate factors of production (labour and capital),’
40
 taxing those rents or extra rewards 
does not impact on investment decisions, and is thus, from the point of view of the state 
whose revenue raising is structurally dependent on the capital accumulation process and the 
creation of surplus value, and from the point of view of other capital, efficient.  Indeed in its 
analysis of taxes and their efficiency the Review found that the then only existing rent tax in 
Australia, the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax, was the most efficient because ’… modelled as 
a pure rent tax [it gives] rise to a zero welfare loss.’
41
The argument from many economists, 
policy developers and some politicians for rent taxes, especially in light of declining profit 
rates and demands for more efficient ways of allocating investment and addressing 
misallocation caused by inefficient taxes, will not disappear.  
D Tax reform as part of the capital accumulation process 
In relation to tax the dominance of capital accumulation expresses itself as the state adjusting 
or reforming its tax system to both make the system more efficient and to attract capital, in 
other words to make the conditions for the creation of surplus value more propitious and its 
distribution more in accordance with the level of capital invested and not lost to deadweight 
costs.
42
 Thus the Henry Tax Review focuses on 4 efficient tax bases
43
 and for a small open 
                                                          
40
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1(b), 218. 
41
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1 (a), 13.  
42
 ‘Deadweight losses arise when individuals change their behaviour in response to higher taxes, substituting 
one kind of behaviour for another which would have been preferred had the tax increase not occurred. For 
example, if income taxes rise, some people might decide to work fewer hours, or they might conclude it is not 
worthwhile training for an additional qualification, or they might stay on welfare rather than look for a job, or be 
deterred from the risk of setting up a company of their own.  Deadweight losses, in other words, represent the 
disincentive costs of tax. They are the value of all the work and output that we lose as a result of taxing people’s 
incomes’ Alex Robson, The Costs of Taxation (CIS Policy Monograph 68, 2005) vii 
<http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-68.pdf>. See also Alan J Auerbach and James 
Hines Jr, ‘Taxation and economic efficiency,’ in  A J Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public 
Economics, (Elsevier 2002) edition 1, volume 3, chapter 21, 1347, 1347.  
43
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1(a), xvii. 
economy like Australia’s a tax regime that attracts foreign investment and encourages home 
grown investment.
44
  
In modern capitalism, finance capital is essential to productive capital and the creation of 
surplus value.
45
 This has systemic consequences, including for tax, for a capital importing 
economy like Australia’s. Nation states compete for mobile capital. In relation to investment, 
as the Review puts it, ‘[i]n a world of increasing capital mobility company income tax and 
other taxes on investment have a major impact on decisions by businesses on where to invest, 
how much and what to invest in and where to record their profits.’
46
  It is this belief on the 
part of policy makers and politicians, irrespective of its validity,
47
 that has been driving 
company tax rates down around the world
48
 and explains, among other things,
49
 the Henry 
Tax Review recommendation for a reduction in the short to medium term of company tax 
rates in Australia from 30% to 25%.
50
 
The ideology of efficiency and using the revenue to cut company tax rates helps explain the 
focus of the Review on a resource rent tax. One capitalist economic tradition views rent taxes 
as not interfering in the process of capital accumulation.
51
 In terms of the ‘least economic 
harm equals most efficient tax’ argument, a well designed resource rent tax ‘…is less likely 
to distort investment and production decisions.’
52
 This is because, it is argued, they have no 
                                                          
44
 Ibid 39-43. 
45
 The issue is not so much the financialisation of capital but the close and interdependent relationship between 
finance and productive capital. See, for example, Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy 
(Polity Press, 2009) 20.  
46
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1 (b), 149. 
47
 See for example Duane Swank, above n 36, 847. There Swank argues that the tax burden on companies in the 
developed world had not changed much up to the mid-1990s. While Swank may have been correct when he 
wrote this, his data is old and the drop in both headline and effective tax rates on companies in Australia and the 
developed world appears real enough now. See Ken Henry et al, above n 1(b) 160-162. 
48
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1(b) 160. 
49
 Those other things might include the Review’s vision of lower tax rates on mobile capital compared to fixed 
factors like resources, land, consumption and that labour which cannot leave Australia for work. 
50
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1 (b), 167. 
51
 See for example Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies Ross, Taxation of Mineral Rents (1983 Clarendon Press). 
52
 Ken Henry et al, above n 1 (b), 222. 
impact on normal rates of return.
53
 They apply in other words only to the returns over and 
above normal returns. Those normal returns continue to be received and are sufficient to 
ensure investment and production occurs as usual. In fact, because the rent tax will be less 
than 100%, and assuming its design is such as to only apply to economic rent, the returns on 
investment will continue to be above normal rates of return all other things being equal.
54
  
E Redistributing and Increasing Surplus Value 
For a social democratic party the temptation of such a magic pudding tax
55
 appears obvious. 
Yet the spending program associated with the $12 billion annual RSPT revenue was not 
social democratic. For the Rudd Government the RSPT revenue was first and foremost to be 
spent on company tax cuts.
56
 This is part of the wider neoliberalisation of tax policy and 
practice
57
 which includes not just a trend to lower tax rates on capital generally but 
differential and lower tax rates on mobile capital and savings, flatter tax rates on income, 
especially reducing top marginal rates on higher income earners and more emphasis on 
consumption taxes.
58
 These reforms are aimed at freeing up more surplus value for capital. In 
other words the search for more efficient taxes is about shifting the tax mix in the short to 
medium term so if needed the same amount of tax can be taken from surplus value with less 
deleterious effects on the production of surplus value out of more productive activity. It can 
also be a way for example through company tax cuts for less tax to be taken from surplus 
value, leaving more for the non-state hostile brothers to compete for or fight over.  
                                                          
53
 Ibid. 
54
 For example a collapse in demand for resources would mean not all other things are equal.  
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But it is not just about the distribution of surplus value. At the heart of the Henry Tax Review 
is the assumption that firms exist to maximise their profits through competition and that 
government policies, such as taxes, must not only take the response of profit maximising 
businesses into account
59
 but treat this process of capital accumulation as paramount. The 
structural dependence of the state on capital
60
 and the efficient extraction of surplus value in 
the process of capitalist production is a key to understanding the Henry Tax Review and the 
RSPT and the MRRT. Because the collection of tax is dependent on the process of capital 
accumulation and the creation of surplus value, the challenge for bourgeois policy makers 
and politicians is to develop a tax system or systems which create the least distortions to the 
market and profit making – the most efficient taxes – and provide, if the pool of surplus value 
is sufficient and there is pressure from the working class to do so, for social spending.   
Yet, reflecting class divisions, tax policy and its development is contradictory and contested.  
This most often occurs at the level of ideas but progressive policies, including tax policies, 
can become part of the lexicon of tax planners when class struggle emerges.
61
 This is part of 
the wider story of the continuity of change within Labor; the continuity of contradictions 
bound up in being a capitalist workers’ party. This dynamic tension and developing 
dominance of capital over labour in the relationship between the two, or as Bramble and 
Kuhn put it, ‘the distancing of the party from many of its traditional policies and its ever 
closer relationship with big business, and the maintenance of Labor’s basic connections with 
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the trade unions’
62
 explains the life story of the latest iteration of rent tax in Australia, from 
the Henry Tax Review recommendations to the RSPT and on to the MRRT. 
V THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO THE MRRT  
The Henry Tax Review recommended there be a resource rent tax for a number of reasons.
63
 
In essence it was because the resources are non-renewable, the return to the community is 
low and the then current arrangements distorted investment and other decisions.
64
 When it 
released the Henry Tax Review the Rudd Labor Government unveiled the Resource Super 
Profits Tax (RSPT), a tax based to a large extent, with some modifications, on the Review’s 
resource rent tax recommendations.
65
   
A Class interests in the responses to Henry 
The government’s response to the Henry Tax Review made the RSPT the epicentre (and 
almost the only measure) of tax reform adopted. There are in my view two reasons for this 
concentration on rent tax and the exclusion of other reforms. If substantially implemented, 
the Review’s proposals and vision would have shaken up all of society – capital and labour. 
The Labor Party was neither going to allow an opportunity for political brand differentiation 
to pass by nor expose itself to attacks from its own members and union and wider working 
class base by, for example, broadening the consumption tax in the interests of efficiency.
66
 
For this reason the Labor government did not consider, as the Henry Tax Review suggested, 
another consumption tax, namely a broad based cash flow tax, a tax on the difference 
between the cash inflows and outflows of business, to fund the abolition of inefficient State 
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taxes like payroll tax and insurance taxes.
67
 Similarly, it did not take up the Review’s 
recommendation to flatten the personal income tax rate system with ‘a $25,000 tax free 
threshold, a 35 per cent marginal rate for 97 per cent of tax payers, and a 45 per cent marginal 
rate for very high-income earners (those earning over $180 000 per year).’
68
 However, 
according to the Australian Council of Trade Unions, (ACTU), this would have increased the 
income tax payable by taxpayers earning between $36000 and $93000.
69
 Again, Labor was 
not going to attack its base, especially in the run up to an election due later that year. 
The move to broadening the consumption tax base and to a flatter personal income tax may 
be something that the Liberal Party, with its close links to business rather than labour, is more 
able to propose and then pursue both because it can wear some opprobrium from workers and 
because it can proclaim the efficiency of such changes and the seeming benefits that will flow 
for all with more conviction. Thus it was the Howard Liberal government who introduced the 
Goods and Service Tax in 2000 after winning a majority of seats but not votes at the 1998 
election on the issue. Tony Abbott, the recently elected Prime Minister, has announced before 
the election in his 2013 Budget in reply, that his government would, within 2 years of coming 
to office, ‘consult with the community to produce a comprehensive white paper on tax 
reform.’
70
 He promised to ‘finish the job that the Henry review started and this government 
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squibbed.’
71
 That White Paper will include the GST and any suggested reforms will be taken 
to the 2016 election.
72
 
B Labor, Systemic Solutions and Tax 
One strength of Labor from the point of view of the system is and has been its links to the 
trade union movement, not business. This has at times made it the champion of reforms that 
attack particular sectors of capital for the benefit of capital as a whole. Drawing on an insight 
from Lance Sharkey, the former Secretary-General of Communist Party of Australia,
73
 
Bramble and Kuhn argue that: 
[Labor’s] partial independence from the capitalist class, both financially and in terms of its 
voting base … means that it can at times better serve the long-term interests of Australian 
capitalism. Unlike the conservative Coalition parties which are tied up both personally and 
financially with sectoral business interests, Labor enjoys a relative freedom to enact 
legislation or introduce policies that hurt the interests of specific sections of capital but 
benefit the class as a whole.
74
 
The Whitlam government’s decision to cut tariffs by 25 percent is one example as are the 
banking reforms of the Hawke Government.
75
 The base broadening tax reforms of the Hawke 
Government in the 1980s are a further example. Apart from almost pulling off introducing a 
consumption tax – unions withdrew support late in the day – the Hawke Government was 
able to include capital gains in the income tax net and fix up the fringe benefits mess by 
making the employers the taxpayer for benefits provided. It also bought the international tax 
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system into the 20
th
 century with credits for foreign tax paid. It introduced dividend 
imputation. After some debate it implemented the petroleum resource rent tax.  
Neoliberal tax base broadening
76
 enabled the Labor Government to make across the board 
company tax cuts from 49% when it came to office in 1983 to 33% when it left in 1996.  It 
also cut the top marginal personal income tax rate from 60% to 46%.  Yet there is a tension 
between managing capitalism and implementing some measures that impact on sections of 
capitalism or even all of capital for the benefit of capital. The imposition of the CGT in 1985 
is a case in point. Bringing such gains within the income tax net is an apparently equitable 
move
77
  which applies disproportionately to the well off. (The top 20 percent own over 60% 
of the wealth in Australia.)
78
 Yet the tension between capital and workers plays itself out here 
too. The original 1985 CGT that Labor introduced only taxed real capital gains. The gains 
were indexed so that only those gains greater than inflation were included in assessable 
income. All other income is taxed on notional gains. For salary and wage earners there was 
and is no inflation adjustment. 
Labor’s concessional tax treatment of capital gains laid the ground work for the Howard 
government to repeal the inflation adjustment and offset it with a concession that included 
only 50% of a capital gain made by individuals or trusts on assets held for more than 12 
months in assessable income.  Treasury estimates the revenue foregone as a result of the 50% 
concession at more than $4 billion in 2012/13.
79
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The ability of Labor to impose solutions on capital that impact on sections of capital is 
always contested. Further the political upheaval over the RSPT and the development of the 
MRRT show that in times of very low levels of class struggle, with the weakening of the role 
of the trade union leadership in the ALP and the strengthening of the role of parliamentarians, 
plus the institutionalisation of neoliberalism in Labor,
80
 this ability to impose systemic 
solutions over the resistance of sectors of capital has declined.
81
  
C Showing weakness in strength 
The mining companies’ backlash against the RSPT, as well as destroying a Prime Minister,
82
 
destroyed the grand expenditure dreams of one-third each of the estimated ten billion on 
company tax cuts, one-third on infrastructure for the mining industry and one-third to cover 
the loss of revenue from superannuation tax concession through superannuation guarantee 
increases.
83
  The destruction of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister and the elevation of Julia 
Gillard to the position were orchestrated through both right and some left wing members of 
the caucus
84
 and the powerful right wing union, the Australian Workers’ Union and Paul 
Howes, its leader.
85
 The $22 million advertising campaign by the Minerals Council of 
Australia was having an effect. The ALP was falling in the polls. An election was due in the 
next couple of months. The right in caucus and in the AWU joined together to replace Rudd 
with Julia Gillard. She introduced a much watered down tax, the MRRT.
86
   
The unions showed their weakness in their strength. Their power was to change Labor 
leaders. Their weakness was not being able to defend a tax on big business. They used their 
power within the ALP to change the leadership and lead a retreat from a broad resource rent 
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tax. This process of retreat was mediated through a troika of politicians – new Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard, Treasurer Wayne Swan and Minister for Resources Martin Ferguson – and a 
troika of the big mining companies – BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Xstrata. The double troika 
agreed to the MRRT.
87
  
The Gillard Government established a group which later became the Policy Transition Group 
(PTG) headed by then Resources Minister Martin Ferguson and former BHP Billiton 
Chairman Don Argus ‘to consult with industry and advise the Government on the 
implementation of the new MRRT and PRRT arrangements.’
88
 These broad design features 
were in the Heads of Agreement that the Government and BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and 
Xstrata signed on 1 July 2010.89 The role of the PTG then became ‘to advise on the technical 
design of the new arrangements.’
90 
The campaign of the mining industry saw the biggest 3 miners in Australia set the terms of 
the design of the proposed MRRT. Their power and dominance over Labor was such that the 
industry not only forced Labor to remove a Prime Minister and set the design parameters of a 
new tax. They were able to set those parameters so restrictively that they and the rest of the 
mining industry will pay little tax under the MRRT. What was missing in this fight between 
Labor and mining capital was any counterbalance of unions, party membership and/or left 
wing politicians, let alone powerful political and social forces to the left of the Party, to 
challenge the power of mining capital and reinforce government resolve. The demise of the 
left in the party, the weakening of the trade union movement and the collapse in membership 
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- important elements of the material base of the Labor Party - made it more susceptible to a 
campaign by mining capital against the RSPT.  This decline in working class numbers and 
strength in the ALP made the party more susceptible to the anti-RSPT campaign and unable 
to develop a groundswell of support. As Bramble and Kuhn put it: ‘The Party today has less 
of a base in the working class that it can use as a counterweight to a section of the capitalist 
class mobilising against particular government policies.’
91
 The rightwing unions had the 
strength, together with parliamentarians, to force the removal of a Prime Minister, but that 
strength was part of the wider campaign to retreat from the mild RSPT. The unions would not 
or could not mobilise effectively against mining capital in defence of a resource rent tax. 
Labor leaders and parliamentarians did not initiate or call on the membership or unions for 
such a move. The Party was frozen in the headlights of mining capital by its weakened links 
with unions and their reduction in social weight.  
D The chimera of revenue 
The end result was a tax that raises very little compared to expectations and predictions. This 
Table from the Parliamentary Library
92
 shows the extent of the decline in predicted revenue – 
from $3.7 billion
93
 initially as the RSP, to the MRRT collecting only $126 million in its first 
six months of operation.
94
  
Table 1: Changes in Minerals Resource Rent tax revenue projections ($ billion) 
  2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 
May 2010 announcement of 
Resource Super Profits Tax 
3.0 9.0 Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not available 
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November 2011 introduction of 
MRRT Bills 
3.7 4.0 3.4 Not 
available 
Not available 
November 2011 MYEFO 3.7 3.8 3.1 Not 
available 
Not available 
2012–13 Budget 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.7 Not available 
October 2012 MYEFO 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.6 Not available 
2013–14 Budget 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.2 
Sources: Australian Government, Budget measures: budget paper no. 2: 2010–11, p. 45, accessed 9 May 
2013; Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Minerals Resource Rent Tax Bill 2011, p. 4, accessed 15 May 
2013; Australian Government, Mid-year economic and fiscal outlook 2011–12, p. 264, accessed 9 May 2013; 
Australian Government, Budget strategy and outlook: budget paper no. 1: 2012–13, p. 5–20, accessed 9 May 
2013; Australian Government, Mid-year economic and fiscal outlook 2012–13, p. 357, accessed 15 May 
2013; Australian Government, Budget strategy and outlook: budget paper no. 1: 2013–14, 2013, pp. 3–18 
and 9–21, accessed 14 May 2013. 
 
 
In short the predicted MRRT revenue has been in freefall for two years. The question is why 
the huge decline? 
While market conditions - continued global instability, commodity price volatility and a high 
dollar - were and are part of the explanation
95
 the real problem appears to be the design faults 
in the tax, in particular the deductibility of State and Territory royalties, the choice companies 
can make of market value of mines rather than historical cost for the tax’s starting base and 
the down streaming of profits to avoid the application of the tax. The tax collected is 
miniscule.
96
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The difference between tax reform in the 1985/86 period and under Rudd and Gillard is that 
in the earlier period the trade union bureaucracy was heavily involved while the Rudd and 
Gillard governments have distanced themselves from the union leadership,
97
 with the 
consequence that the Henry Tax Review and subsequent tax reform developments had no 
effective union involvement.  
E  Tax to mimic competition 
The RSPT was to be a measure to redistribute super profits from mining capital to all of 
incorporated capital through company tax cuts. Its other role was to mimic competition by 
reducing the amount that the rate of profit of mining companies exceeded the average rate.  
One of the keys to understanding the dynamics of capitalism is the tendency for profit rates to 
move towards the average both within industries and across them, or as Marx puts it a 
‘general equalisation of surplus-value to an average profit.’
98
 Competition does this. Thus 
where industries have high profits other capitalists come in, reducing the profit rate in that 
sector and increasing it in sectors they have left or not invested in. However sometimes there 
are barriers to competition or other factors that impede or inhibit or override competition, 
Marx’s alien forces.
99
 Monopoly or oligopoly provides one example. So too does landed 
property. Marx described it this way. ‘Such an alien force and barrier are presented by landed 
property, when confronting capital in its endeavour to invest in land; such a force is the 
landlord vis-à-vis the capitalist.’
100
 The tax then becomes a mechanism for helping address 
the effects of the alien force that is landed property rich in minerals by reducing the rate of 
profit to the extent of the tax. The filcher is filched. The extra profit arising from the filching 
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is taxed and a redistribution of surplus value from other capitalists to the monopolist or 
oligopolists occurs.  
Private ownership of land in agriculture and state ownership of minerals together with private 
rights to mine in the mining industry are the alien forces which give power to this transfer, 
this ‘filching’ of surplus value by the mining companies from other capitalists. Indeed the 
state in extracting royalties or taxes on super profits may be acting like capitalist landlords, 
filching surplus value through its ownership of the minerals (State and Territory 
Governments) or through its effective monopoly income tax power. Yet despite this notional 
power the Labor Party in government could not resist the powerful mining industry. 
F The power of the mining industry 
The mining industry is powerful. Mining accounts for about 7% of GDP and about 2% of 
employees or 260,000 workers.
 101
 Minerals are the country’s biggest export. Excluding oil 
and gas, they ‘were worth approximately $164 billion in 2011-12, accounting for around 52% 
of total exports (goods and services) and 62% of merchandise exports.’
102
 Australia is near 
the top of the list of mineral producers and has very large reserves in a wide range of 
resources.
103
  
Despite the Minerals Council highlighting possible sovereign risk issues and suggesting one 
possibility for mining companies was to go to other countries during its campaign against the 
RSPT, according to Behre Dolbear’s respected rankings system, Australia was the best place 
for resource investment in the world, and has been for the last 3 years.
104
 One of the seven 
criteria in judging that is the tax regime as it applies to the mining industry.  
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  Chris Wyatt and Taylor McCurdy (eds), ‘Behre Dolbear 2013 Ranking of Countries for Mining Investment: 
This number one ranking may be because Australia’s RSPT/MRRT prompted other nations to 
revisit their own tax regimes. Certainly other countries turned an eye towards their mining 
industries. Behre Dolbear notes that increasing government debt and mining booms have 
‘inspired officials in almost every minerals-producing nation to consider raising mining-
related taxes and fees.’
 105
 They go on to point out that Australia’s attempts to impose 
resource rent taxes may well have been the catalyst or inspiration for this global re-
awakening in governments wanting better returns from the mining industry.
106
  
The economic power that the mining industry has, and its potential future profits from the 
massive reserves, translates into political power. The exercise of that power resonated in the 
ALP and helps explain the fall of Rudd Mark I, the rise of Gillard to power and the 
development of a tax that brings in much much less that expected. The logical outcome of 
negotiating a tax with the 3 most powerful mining companies in Australia would appear to be 
a tax that doesn’t tax much.  
The specific design reasons for this problematic tax should prompt the question – how did 
this arise? That can only be understood against a background of decades of class 
collaboration from the union leadership, a massive decline in strikes over the last 20 years, 
the ALP’s embrace of neoliberalism as part of the generalisation of class collaboration and 
the weakening of the power of union influence within the party. It is the shift in the ALP over 
time from a capitalist workers’ party to CAPITALIST workers’ party that explains the 
process of change that led to the MRRT and its lack of bite.  
Certainly the Labor Party’s greater overt commitment to the market, to privatisations, to 
restraining unions, to cutting public services, the even greater influence and power of the 
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Right and the shift of the Parliamentary Left to the right, the changing nature of class 
background of Labor parliamentarians, the collapse in branch membership, all indicate a 
party in change from in the past some balance between capitalist and worker to more 
CAPITALIST and less worker influence. 
The ALP, as a capitalist workers’ party, has always adopted the dominant economic ideology 
of the time.
107
 In Keynesian times the Labor Party is Keynesian.
108
 In neoliberal times the 
ALP is neoliberal,
109
 and its links with the trade union bureaucracy make it a good vehicle for 
carrying the neoliberal program into the workplace. It is because the trade union bureaucracy 
are the mediators between labour and capital that they are pro-capitalist and best able to 
spread capitalist ideas and policies into the workforce.
110
  
G Elite gridlock? 
The Labor Government’s lukewarm reaction to the recommendations of the Henry Tax 
Review – they initially adopted only a few of the 138 recommendations
111
 - reflects a pattern 
of tax timidity caused by elite gridlock.  That gridlock stems in part from two aspects of the 
class nature of the main parties. The Liberals’ close ties to business make them less likely to 
impose systemic tax solutions that impact adversely on major sections of capital. The focus 
will be on taxing labour and their systemic solutions, for example the introduction of the 
GST, represent this underlying class approach. Their proposed white paper on taxation will 
focus on how best to tax workers, in the context perhaps of a reduction in the need to raise 
revenue from efficient sources because of a reduction in government spending, in particular 
on social and welfare services.  
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The decline of Labor as the party best equipped to impose systemic tax solutions for the 
benefit of all capital at the expense of some sections of it, exemplified by the history of the 
MRRT, means that there will likely be no party into the future arguing for progressive tax 
reform that taxes business.  
The problem for the system in the future is that this incremental slowly slowly approach – 
even if it occurs or eventuates  à la MRRT - fails to address the big challenges that the Henry 
Tax Review tried to address: demographic changes, demands for adequate social spending on 
health, education and the like, globalisation, the inefficient mix of current taxes, the need to 
attract foreign investment, the changing nature of Australia’s role in the global economy, the 
rise of Asia and climate change.
112
 
These drivers are not going to disappear overnight. Underlying this all is the question of what 
is happening with profit rates globally and in Australia. If the global economy goes into 
further recession and Australia joins them the pressure for tax reform that cuts tax burdens on 
capital may increase.  
Against this background delaying or dismissing tax reform action now will only increase 
systemic pressure for big bang reform in the future. The efficient tax argument is of particular 
importance for capital in times of declining profit rates. As Henry put it ‘…most taxes result 
in some loss of economic efficiency’
113
 because they impact on work, investment and 
consumption choices. Couple this with the Review’s analysis that many State taxes are 
inefficient and that they should be abolished
114
 and a future shift to more efficient (but not 
necessarily equitable) taxes like rates and land taxes as well as broad based consumption 
taxes becomes not only a possibility but eventually, given the systemic drivers for ongoing 
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tax reform, a necessity. Indeed, the elite gridlock around tax reform, one caused in my view 
by the particular and seemingly irreconcilable interests of sections of capital, the close links 
of the Liberals with business, the weakness of the ALP now to impose solutions for the 
benefit of the whole system at the expense of sections of it and fear still of possible working 
class reactions to further shifting the burden of tax on to workers, means that the tax system 
may be moving towards stasis if not crisis. The solution of the Coalition, close to business, 
may be through tax shifts on to labour and cuts to services that are labour’s social wage.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion of the MRRT in my view indicates that the ALP remains a 
capitalist workers’ party but that the capitalist aspect of the party has grown stronger and that 
of labour weaker.  The underlying economic crises of global capitalism, the crises of 
profitability in much of the developed world, the collapse in Australia of class struggle over 
the last 3 decades, the adoption of class collaboration by the unions, the weakening of their 
strength, the ALP’s long slow dance with neoliberalism, and the Party’s commitment to 
managing capitalism help explain both the RSPT proposal and its mini-me version, the 
MRRT, in the context of Labor as a capitalist workers’ party and the changing nature of its 
relationship with the 2 major classes in Australia today, capital and labour. The shift in the 
balance of class forces to capital societally and in the ALP means that one of Labor’s 
traditional roles of imposing solutions on sections of capital for the benefit of all capital is 
being undermined. The MRRT is one logical consequence of that shift.   
